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Abstract. The evolution of the technology and the changes in the organization 
and control of the critical infrastructures of nations are creating a new combat 
front. The cases studied in this paper relate to the attack to the information 
systems and services of Estonia, in May 2007, and Georgia, in August 2008,  
occurring at the same time as the conventional military operation executed by 
the Russian Federation’s army in the South Ossetia. The Russian Federation has 
been repeatedly accused of this operations, but the data collected raises doubts 
and in the second case-study showed the existence of a poorly organized 
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network, related to Russian criminal organizations, supporting the possibility of 
this being an instance of the Maoist concept of the “People’s war”. This paper 
will also show that, despite the unsophisticated resources used in most of the 
attacks and to promote them, the damages in the selected targets were 
considerable. 
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Introduction 
The evolution of the technology changed the way nations fight. The battle field has 
changed along time, reflecting the four basic ways of confrontation: the melee (face to 
face combat, without organization, where each men takes is own decisions on what 
and how to do); massing (massive attacks using rigid formations); manoeuvre 
(adoption of manoeuvre and combat tactics); swarming (disperse attacks characterized 
by a high level of autonomy, requiring a high organizational level that allows the 
maintenance of the strategic coherence) [1]. This evolution is gaining new 
perspectives, once the physical world is more and more vulnerable to attacks 
occurring in the digital world, cyberspace, once it is getting more and more dependent 
on information and information systems. In fact, the United States Department of 
Defence information system alone suffers something like 250.000 attacks every year 
[2].  
Although the use of the cyberspace to conduct military operations, as another 
military front, can be classified as a type of irregular war, once there are not well 
defined combat front-lines or rears and because it occurs in an unlimited space [3], it 
may involve the preparation and execution of military operations conducted by the 
entities of one nation against one other, with identical objectives to those of a 
conventional war and sometimes aiming to weaken the conventional communication 
and control enemy defences, in order to weaken its conventional ability to response 
[4]. This can mean the interference, the control or the destruction of the information 
and of the civilian and military systems, of the critical infrastructures like the 
communication centres of the medical emergency, transportation, energy, water and 
other critical services. Also the civilian population’s computing systems can be 
affected in order to achieve the defined goals. Therefore, the consequences of a 
combat in the cyberspace can be as real as those of a conventional war and can even 
cause casualties [5]. 
In April 2007, Russia was accused by Estonia of attacking its digital structure, in 
an event that many consider to be the first conflict that can be named as a cyberwar 
[6]. Just over a year of being accused of those, Russia was again accused to perform a 
cyberattack to Georgia (one of the countries of the extinct Soviet Union) on August of 
2008. This attack was made at same time as Russian’s armed forces attacked 
conventionally Georgia. Those attacks were related with South Ossetia, a region of 
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Georgia known to be pro-Russian and with separatist claims. Although the poor data, 
there were some appeals on the Internet to cybercombat that allows the evaluation of 
the intentions and some of the resources used. The appeals were made in several 
Russian language fora and on the websites www.stopgeorgia.ru and 
www.stopgeorgia.info, on an action with a very strong, if not exclusive, popular 
character. 
People’s war 
The digital attack to Georgia was coordinated from the domain www.stopgeorgia.info 
(based in German and quickly closed by the owner of the web server) and 
www.stopgeorgia.ru. This last site was based  on the United Kingdom, created on 9 
August of 2008, and kept in operation until 13 August, when it was suspended, 
returning to work after twenty four hours, without the software section and with a 
inoperative forum.  
In the manifest presented on Website it can be read: 
 
We, the representatives of Russian’s hacking underworld, can’t 
tolerate Georgian’s provoking, in all their manifestations. We want to 
live in a free world and free of aggressions and lies in web space. We 
don’t need the orientation of authorities or other people’s 
orientations, but to act in accord with convictions based on 
patriotism, of conscience and in believing on justice force. You can 
call us cyber-criminals and terrorists, triggering a war and killing 
people. But we will fight and it’s unacceptable the aggression against 
Russian Federation on internet. 
We demand the end of attacks in what regards to field of information 
and means, and call to all media and journalists to cover the events 
objectively. Until situation changes, we will stop the divulgation of 
false information from occidental governments and from Georgian’s 
government and media. We appeal to all that aren’t indifferent to the 
lies of websites political Georgian’s to contribute, all, who are able to 
inhibit the propagation of black information. (Translated from 
www.stopgeorgia.ru).    
 
On the software section it was possible to download a tool to perform flood attacks 
with intent to perform an attack by DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service), an 
anonymization tool, a tool of saturation of telephone lines using a voice over IP 
software and a tool of mobile phone’s saturation using the transmission of SMS 
(Short Message Service). This website appealed to an attack to a list of targets and 
called the Internet users to a special effort on the 13
th
 of August, declared day of 
mourning for the victims of South Ossetia’s invasion. The list of targets made 
available in the Website as well as their availability through the 13
th
 to the 25
th
 of 
August 2008 is displayed in table 1. Some of the websites changed their server’s 
location to avoid the break of service, like television channel Rustavi2 (with frequent 
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online transmissions), or to avoid the change of contents (defacement), like the 
website www.civil.ge, that was changed to include images that compared the 
Georgian’s President to Adolf Hitler. It is important to refer that some of the websites 
were able, during the pick of attacks, to be temporarily available, whereby the table 
aims to provide the comparative state of the combat effects during the monitored 
days. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the intensity of the effects, some will take long 
to be solved once Georgia its a country that does not depend on the internet and, once 
the country has other priorities, many of the websites stays to rebuild although they 
had reassumed their control.  
 






















Fig. 1. Evolution of the attacks from 13/08/2008 to 24/08/2008 
Some rumours say that Russian Business Networks (RBN), a criminal organization 
detected some years ago, are involved on those attacks diverting the traffic directed to 
Georgia through Russia. Once the access from Portugal to Georgia is usually made 
through Turkey, the dates on Table 1 do not reflect the eventual penalizations of 
performance that result from this type of attacks. Although, it was possible to verify, 
in some situations, that the access to websites on Georgia was made by Azerbaijan, 
via Russia, with no difficult. This study also used, for several times, a website of 
Russian’s traceroute and there weren’t significant differences, with respect to servers 
responses, on results obtained on accesses by Russian Federation when compared 




State of the Website (checked between 
17:30 ands 18:30, GMT) 








parliament.ge  Georgia Inactive Not Affected 
assistancegeorgia.org.ge  Georgia 
Very 
slow 
Inactive Very slow 
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State of the Website (checked between 
17:30 ands 18:30, GMT) 













Holland X Not Affected 
mdf.org.ge  




X Inactive Not Affected 




corruption.ge  n/d Inactive 
constcourt.gov.ge  Georgia Not Affected Inactive Not Affected 
insurance.caucasus.net  Georgia Not Affected Inactive Not Affected 
mc.gov.ge n/d Inactive 
nsc.gov.ge  Georgia “under construction” 
supremecourt.ge  Georgia Not Affected 
iberiapac.ge  Georgia Not Affected 
court.gov.ge Georgia “under reconstruction”  
civil.ge  Estonia Not Affected 





all.ge Georgia “under construction” Inactive 
geres.ge Georgia Not Affected 
rustavi2.com.ge USA Inactive Not Affected Slow 
opentext.org.ge  Germany Not Affected 
6        
  
State of the Website (checked between 
17:30 ands 18:30, GMT) 














Inactive Not Affected 
sanet.ge/gtze Georgia Inactive 
messenger.com.ge  Georgia Not Affected 
primenewsonline.com USA Inactive  
Not 
Affected 
presidpress.gov.ge  Georgia White page 
sakinform.ge n/a Inactive 
sakartvelo.ru  n/a Inactive 
internews.ge Georgia Inactive 
internews.org.ge  Georgia Inactive 




internet.ge Georgia Not Affected 
stream.ge 
Georgia Not Affected X 
Holland X Not Affected Inactive 
presa.ge Georgia Not Affected 
medianews.ge Georgia Not Affected Slow 
Not 
Affected 
Table 1. Situation, along the conflict, of the websites listed as preferential targets  
   
 Also in some Russian language fora an appeal to combat was made. The majority 
limited the actions to the dissemination of links to www.stopgeorgia.ru, but some 
made other attack resources available. That is the case of http://clubs.ya.ru that 
proposes the creation of a batch to automatically send ping requests to the targets 
defined in stopgeorgia.ru; and of http://aeterna.ru that made available a link to an html 
file (Figure 2) that accesses the targets and, through an automatic update of the page, 
possible in some browsers, floods the targeted servers. 
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Fig. 2. Source code of the webpage distributed to perform the attacks. 
The website also provides a list of proxy servers (including some only available to 
computers located on the Russian Federation) and a list of Georgia’s websites 
vulnerable to attacks by SQL injection, explaining for each case the way to proceed to 
obtain the desired results. We can conclude that part of the attacks was organized with 
few resources although, as we can see on Table 1, the effects are significant. Once 
Georgia’s government accused the Russia Federation of being responsible by those 
actions [7] it is important to try to understand who is the responsible for these 
websites. This is a difficult job to do but, in this case, it’s facilitated by the existence 
of a website dedicated to this cyberwar. A traceroute and a consult to a whois server, 
indicates that it is a domain located in the United Kingdom under claimed 
responsibility of someone with the e-mail address anac109@mail.ru, with a contact 
telephone number from Irkutsk, on Siberia (Figure 3). Some researches in a few 
search engines provided the information that this e-mail address was used to register 
other domains: dokim.ru and rakar.ru (Figure 4), both based in the United States of 
America. This information allowed us to find out some more data related to the owner 
of the domain, like his alleged name: Andrej V. Uglovatyj that, of course, it’s 
probably false, mainly if we consider the subject of the domain dokim.ru: sell false 
passports! In fact, this website sells passports from Russia Federation (supposedly 
lawfully issued) and from some European countries namely Lithuania, Leetonia, 
United Kingdom and Germany. The price of one passport from European Union 
varies between 3000€ and 3500€. The domain rakar.ru has illicit objectives too: to sell 
plastic cards with magnetic stripe with the data of legitimate credit cards and 
respective PIN codes. Those data are obtained illegally and sold, according with the 
quantity bought, by unit value between US$70 and US$450.  
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Fig. 3. stopgeorgia.ru domain’s owner and location 
 
Fig. 4. dokim.ru and rakar.ru domain’s owner and location 
Analysing those facts, it is very provable that who ever as coordinated the cyberattack 
is not related with any official entity of Moscow.  This indicates that there are other 
identities capable to mobilize the necessary means to successfully attack 
governmental websites, using attacks by DDoS or exploring vulnerabilities, such as 
SQL injections. As a matter of fact, in a message in the forum of website 
www.stopgeorgia.ru it could be read: “DDoS attacks have limited effects. We should 
find vulnerabilities and use it. DDoS just as a last resource”. Another possibility, 
raised by some analysts in the period of the attack to Estonia [8] is the use by the 
Russian Federation of the oriental strategy called “people’s war”, where the 
government’s role is to protect their citizens that, on their own, decide to get involved 
in a combat while, simultaneously stimulating nationalist feelings [9][10].  
Conclusions 
The case of the cyberattack to Georgia shows, that the attacks to the information 
systems of a government can be used by other states or nationalist groups from rival 
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countries to paralyze the public services or, at least, stop the general citizen from 
accessing  the Internet, for instance to provide information that can reach the 
international community. The studied case seems to be the first to simultaneously use 
a cyberwar aiming the civilian infrastructure and a military conventional intervention. 
This concept of cyberwar is a mix of the Maoist concept of “people’s war” and the 
Trotsky’s combat strategy, where specialized groups attack critical targets (power 
stations, communication infrastructures, etc.) expecting that the general public will 
then support the military action, instead of expecting their help to perform the actual 
action. 
Countries that are changing their processes in a way that make them more and 
more dependent on the informational infrastructures, need to consider the cyberspace 
as another frontier that requires security measures that can guarantee their national 
interests. 
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